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of the phenotype. Finding such a correlation is neither an end
unto itself, nor is it really an answer; rather, it is, at best, only a first
methodological step that can be used to manipulate and explore
the developmental process at hand (Nijhout 1990).
The bottom line here is that the S&B’s nativist model, despite its
success, is not a good model of genetic development of colour cat-
egorization. The proof for this lies in the very evolutionary dynam-
ics that the authors’ model provides. Focal perception is a complex
process. It is not only determined by genetics, but by development,
neurophysiological constraints, as well as experience. The highly
rapid and diverse evolutionary dynamics observed in S&B’s exper-
iment is hardly, if ever, possible for complex neurophysiological
functions (Bowmaker 1998; Lickliter & Honeycutt 2003; Schlicht-
ing & Pigliucci 1998; Surridge et al. 2003; Worden 1995). This in
itself casts doubts on the appropriateness of the model.
In sum, I applaud S&B’s efforts to model category sharing. By
the same token, I believe that they need to come up with a better
model for the genetics of colour categorization. I encourage them
to do so.
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Abstract Research into child language reveals that it takes a long time for
children to learn the correct mapping of colour words. Steels & Bel-
paeme’s (S&B’s) guessing game, however, models fast learning of words.
We discuss computational studies based on cross-situational learning,
which yield results that are more consistent with the empirical child lan-
guage data than those obtained by S&B.
Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) have successfully shown how compu-
tational modeling can contribute greatly to the study of the evo-
lution of language and cognition. S&B have – in our opinion cor-
rectly – decided to write their article from an engineer’s point of
view. We feel, however, that their model of linguistic communica-
tion would have been more realistic, and therefore the results they
obtained more robust, if they had used a model of acquiring colour
categories through multiple contexts.
S&B model the communication between agents using the
guessing game model, which is, in itself, not unreasonable. Their
claim, however, that this game is “equivalent” to colour chip nam-
ing experiments carried out by anthropologists (sect. 2.4.2), is not
justified, in our opinion. The guessing game is primarily a model
of learning through corrective feedback, whereas colour chip
naming experiments consist of an anthropologist (A) asking an in-
formant (B) to point out, on a chip set, the focal colour of a colour
term from B’s language. There are three important differences be-
tween the anthropological experiments and the guessing game.
First, B is not doing any learning, in fact, A is learning about B’s
representation of colour and about B’s language. Second, A does
not correct B’s responses or provide any feedback about them. Fi-
nally, there is no negotiation between A and B about what the
words should refer to.
This positive feedback loop between the choice of which words
to use and their success in communication is the main learning
mechanism in the guessing game. Indeed, S&B claim that the
feedback loop is a necessary requirement for cultural language de-
velopment (sect. 5, condition 1), although in fact it is widely ac-
cepted that children receive little, if any, corrective feedback while
learning words (Bloom 2000, but see Chouinard & Clark 2003, for
an alternative account). In computational simulations of lexicon
creation and learning, similar to those presented by S&B, we have
shown that agents using a cross-situational statistical learner (a
variant of Siskind’s, 1996, cross-situational learner) can success-
fully develop a shared vocabulary of grounded word meanings
without corrective feedback (Smith 2003; Vogt 2004). In our
model, as in guessing games, hearers have to infer what speakers
are referring to, but unlike in guessing games, the agents do not
have any way of verifying the effectiveness of their attempts at
communication. Instead, the agents use covariances to learn a
mapping between words and categories based on the cooccur-
rence of words and potential referents across multiple situations.
Although young children do learn to relate colour terms to
colours, it takes them a considerable length of time to find the ap-
propriate mappings (e.g., Andrick & Tager-Flusberg 1986; Sand-
hofer & Smith 2001). For example, it has been estimated that, on
average, children required over 1,000 trials to learn the three ba-
sic colour terms “red,” “green,” and “yellow” (Rice 1980, cited in
Sandhofer & Smith 2001). Sandhofer and Smith suggest that chil-
dren go through different stages in learning colour words: First
they appear to learn that colour terms relate to the domain of
colour, and only then can they actually learn the correct mapping.
This has also been observed by Andrick and Tager-Flusberg
(1986), who additionally suggest that children find it difficult to
learn the boundaries of colour categories, thus slowing down the
learning of colour words. Research into child lexical acquisition is,
of course, dominated by the problem of referential indeterminacy,
and many constraints have been suggested to explain how children
reduce indeterminacy (see, e.g., Bloom 2000). Very few of these
accounts, however, allow for the fact that children hear words in
multiple different contexts, and can use this to determine the in-
tended reference. Recent empirical research, indeed, shows that
a cross-situational model of learning provides a robust account of
lexical acquisition in general, and of the acquisition of adjectives,
including colour categories, in particular. Houston-Price et al.
(2003) suggest that the children in their study used cross-situa-
tional learning to disambiguate word reference, even though their
experiments were designed with attentional cues. In addition,
Mather and Schafer (2004) show that children can learn the ref-
erence of nouns by exploiting covariations across multiple con-
texts. Akhtar and Montague (1999) demonstrate that children use
cross-situational learning to discover the meanings of novel adjec-
tives. Klibanoff and Waxman (2000), furthermore, provide empir-
ical support for their proposal that adjectival categories are
learned cross-situationally, within the context of basic level cate-
gories.
A comparison of the guessing game and a cross-situational sta-
tistical learner, using computational simulations, has shown that,
in the guessing game, coherence in production between agents is
considerably higher and that learning is much faster (Vogt &
Coumans 2003). This means that agents using cross-situational
statistical learning have considerable difficulties in arriving at a
shared lexicon, although in the end they manage to overcome
them. Note, however, that cross-situational statistical learning im-
proves when: agents’ semantic categories are similar (Smith 2003);
learners assume mutual exclusivity (Smith 2005); and the context
size is relatively small (Smith & Vogt 2004). This slower rate of ac-
quisition is thus consistent with the empirical evidence that chil-
dren learn colour words relatively slowly. Importantly, as yet un-
published studies have shown that the category variance among
agents in the cross-situational learner tends to be much higher
than that seen from the guessing games. This suggests that nego-
tiating category boundaries in the cross-situational learner is more
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difficult, which could confirm Andrick and Tager-Flusberg’s
(1986) finding.
S&B have presented a model of learning colour words that is
fast and based on corrective feedback. Research on child lexicon
acquisition suggests, however, that colour categories are actually
acquired slowly and through cross-situational learning. If cross-
situational learning is, indeed, a more plausible model than the
guessing game, then the results achieved by S&B may no longer
hold for their account of cultural learning.
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Abstract: With respect to human color categories, Steels & Belpaeme’s
(S&B’s) simulations over-emphasize the possible influence of language. In
humans, color processing is the result of a long evolutionary process in
which categories developed without language. Common principles of
color processing lead to similar color categories, but interindividual varia-
tion in color categories exists. Even color-deficiencies, causing large dif-
ferences in color categories, remain inconspicuous in everyday life,
thereby contradicting the hypothesis that language could play a role in
color category formation.
The main focus of Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B) study is category
formation in artificial agents and the role language could play in
this process. Beyond that, they consider the possible relevance of
language for color categories in humans. Neither issue seems to
be adequately addressed by the simulations.
First, under the conditions assumed by S&B, it is almost trivial
that language would make categories of the simulated artificial
agents more similar. S&B specify their stimuli in a homogeneous
color space. Because there are no constraints or dissipative mech-
anisms, any kind of coupling will increase the similarity between
categories, and eventually lead to identical categories. S&B intro-
duce such coupling in their simulations with color genes, lan-
guage, or nonuniform stimulus distributions. Not surprisingly, in
all of these cases, categories of different agents become similar.
Even for the simple case of artificial agents, however, success of
the “sharing by language” strategy requires that communication
corresponding to “guessing games” would occur with fairly high
frequency.
Second, for the case of human color categories, the scenarios
considered by S&B are similarly inappropriate. They ignore, for
example, the properties and constraints of neural processing and
representation in the visual system. There are strong nonlinear
mechanisms, such as the division in On- and Off-pathways, which
effectively segregates color space into categorical half-spaces.
Chromatic preferences of color-selective neurons tend to cluster,
both at precortical stages (e.g., Derrington et al. 1984) and in the
visual cortex (De Valois et al. 2000; Kiper et al. 1997; Komatsu et
al. 1992; Lennie et al. 1990; Wachtler et al. 2003). In other words,
not all chromaticities are equal. So far, the exact relation between
coding at early stages of the visual system and perceptual cate-
gories is still unclear (see e.g., the comments on Saunders & van
Brakel 1997; for a recent discussion see Valberg 2001). Neverthe-
less, nonuniform distribution of color preferences places con-
straints on category formation. Similarities between the proper-
ties of neurons in the visual system and efficient codes for natural
colors (Caywood et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2002; Wachtler et al. 2001)
further indicate that color vision is adapted to the statistics of nat-
ural chromatic signals, which implies shared categories.
The corresponding genetic coupling of color categories is not
realized by “color genes,” but rather by the genes that control the
development and function of the visual system. These genes
evolved over many millions of years, and evolutionary success was
not determined by successful communication, but by efficient
processing of visual information, probably including such impor-
tant tasks as image segmentation and the finding of food (e.g.,
Mollon 1989). Experimental evidence for shared color categories
has been found in other species, as well, such as chimpanzees
(Matsuno et al. 2004) or even flies (Troje 1993).
Despite the common processing principles underlying human
color vision, there are considerable interindividual differences in
the prereceptoral, receptoral, and postreceptoral stages of visual
processing. As a result, for example, the loci of unique hues are
broadly distributed (e.g., Webster et al. 2000). How does this vari-
ability compare to the results of S&B’s simulations? S&B fail to
specify how similar categories have to be in order to be “suffi-
ciently shared.” In any case, with respect to human color vision,
S&B’s ideal of “complete” sharing is not realistic.
Variation in color vision is most striking in “color-blind” sub-
jects. In dichromats, such as protanopes or deuteranopes, one
type of cone photoreceptor is entirely missing. Interestingly, de-
spite their receptoral color space of reduced dimensionality,
dichromats use the same basic color terms as trichromats when
asked to describe their color percepts (Boynton & Scheibner
1967). However, their category regions in color space differ con-
siderably from those of trichromats (Wachtler 2004). This is not
surprising, because certain colors belonging to different cate-
gories of trichromats, such as trichromats’ reds and greens, are in-
distinguishable for dichromats. Nevertheless, dichromats seem to
possess perceptual categories corresponding to those of trichro-
mats, and they seem to achieve them by dividing their reduced
color space using both spectral composition and luminance (Boyn-
ton & Scheibner 1967; Jameson & Hurvich 1978; Wachtler et al.
2004).
Several lines of evidence indicate that the color categories of
dichromats revealed by color naming reflect perceptual cate-
gories. For example, dichromats claim that “red,” “green,” “blue,”
and “yellow” constitute unique and different percepts. Further-
more, dichromats consistently report a “red” contribution both in
short-wavelength and in long-wavelength stimuli, asserting that
the “red” is of the same perceptual quality in both cases (Wachtler
et al. 2004).
The color naming behavior of color-deficient observers suggests
that language plays a role in the acquisition of the lexicon of color
names, but does not influence perceptual categories. Just like
color-normals, dichromats have to learn the words to name their
percepts. Given that the structure of their color space is different,
they cannot achieve a perfect match, so they assign those names
to their perceptual categories that constitute the best possible
match to those of trichromats.
It is impossible for dichromats to have the same categories as
color-normal trichromats. If communication about color would be
as crucial as S&B suggest, dichromats would be lost in continuous
frustration. No matter how long they would learn, it would be im-
possible for them to adjust their categories accordingly. Luckily,
however, color naming plays only a marginal role in everyday life,
situations that require accurate communications of color are ex-
tremely rare. Many color-deficient individuals are not even aware
about their condition until their first color-vision test. Thus, lan-
guage, although important in establishing a consistent lexicon for
our color categories, is too weak a link to influence perceptual cat-
egories.
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